Sunday, November 19, 2006

Friedman's Folly (O.K. It's pretty minor, considering!)

Lots of good stuff is being/has been written about Milton Friedman in various obits and tributes the last few days. I've only gradually become aware of Friedman and his significance in the last few years, as my interest in economics and libertarian thought has grown, but needless to say, he was by all accounts a giant. Since I don't have too much to add, what prompted this post was a near-footnote at the end of this nice obit from Newsweek, which indicates that Friedman, of all people, appears to have been the author, or at least a major advocate, of the "starve the beast" meme (i.e. that cutting taxes will force the government to cut spending, eventually) which I mocked rather mercilessly in this space not long ago.

Whoa! If someone with as much wattage as Friedman backed the idea, maybe it wasn't completely foolish, even if it turned out to be wrong in the event... nah! Sorry, I for one, still can't quite buy it. Maybe I'll run across (or look up) Friedman's detailed argument, but for now, I strongly lean toward seeing it as another example proving that even clearly brilliant people can on exceptional occasions be spectacularly foolish (see also Clinton, William J.). If such bright lights can be so unexpectedly dim, this should be a serious caution to the rest of us!

Thursday, November 16, 2006

"Realism" and the U.N.

Michael Young has become one of my favorite writers on the Middle East and the wars (both Iraq and “on terror” which are two distinct wars, whatever the Administration may claim) in progress. He seems to have a deep grasp of the history and forces at work within the region, and also maintains a balance of perspective and principle in his observations. I share his general view, as far as I can divine it, which is a certain broad sympathy with the vision and goals of spreading liberal democracy (i.e. the “neocon” vision) coupled to a harsh judgment on just how badly the effort has floundered in Iraq. Young's latest column at Reason actually has me taking off on a related tangent: the moral bankruptcy of the U.N.

I imagine I’m hardly breaking much new ground here, I know the idea of a “democratic U.N.” has been floated before, but I’d just like to chip in my two cents. I actually will not go so far as to dismiss the U.N. as totally useless, I do believe it serves at least two worthwhile functions. First, the humanitarian relief efforts conducted under U.N. auspices are undoubtedly very valuable. It’s hard to find much fault with UNICEF vaccinating kids or supplying clean drinking water, except that these efforts are subject to the ever-present concerns about bureaucratic overhead and corruption, but then that will be true of any organization.

Second, I do believe there is at least some value in providing a standing forum for multilateral diplomacy. Let’s be clear about what I mean by “diplomacy,” as this gets to the heart of my critique of the U.N. I simply mean “old school” or “classical” diplomacy, wherein (de facto) sovereign states negotiate matters of their own interests, period. This is the traditional “realist” form of diplomacy and foreign policy. I think there is an absolute need for diplomacy of this sort; this is one thing that “realists” have right. I strongly agree that is generally a mistake to simply not talk to other governments, however odious they may be, when our interests and security are at stake, i.e. see Iran and North Korea as recent examples. I fully understand that these governments may not be trustworthy and that talks may prove fruitless, but I generally don’t see the harm in talking. Talking is NOT a substitute for action, which is a common critique--there is no reason action cannot be taken in parallel with talks. And so on. So, as a forum for this sort of diplomacy, I think the U.N. has value.

The vision of the U.N. breaks down when we move from the arena of classical, cold-eyed, hard-hearted realism about the world as it is into the moral realm of how the world should be. The idea that all current governments are equally legitimate is clearly a moral absurdity. Although reasonable people should find those who would try to equate, for example, Bush and Saddam to be clearly overwrought, let us avoid any real controversy and find other examples that don’t involve the U.S. and any current or recent antagonists. Is it in any way justifiable to put, for example, the government of Myanmar (Burma) on the same moral footing as, oh let’s say, the government of Norway? Or how about the government of Sudan treated as morally equal to that of New Zealand, or Canada, or… you get the picture. So as an ongoing atrocity unfolds in Darfur (and another may be brewing next door in the Horn) the U.N., as nearly always, sits idly by because various interested parties can easily block action, while the butchers (or at least their sponsors) sit in Khartoum and rail about their sovereignty.

The U.N. has no moral authority. As far as I’m concerned, this is not a rant by some oddball crank (though that I may be), but a simple statement of fact. It cannot have any such authority, as long as it is constituted of “sovereign” states, which themselves must pass no test for moral authority. This is not to say I favor disbanding the U.N. (see the good points mentioned above). I am even one of those “mushy-headed” souls who believe in the ideals of international law and universal human rights, but I believe it is clear that the U.N. is not the place to look for such ideals. Nor will it ever be so, unless it is radically redefined.

Tuesday, November 07, 2006

The (Ir)Rational Economics of Voting

I’m not sure what to make of the (often smug, not always) assurances from many “educated” commentators that it’s not only OK to not vote, but rational and intelligent. If you read political commentary, you’ve certainly ran into this many times, especially in the last few years (or so is my subjective impression). But in quick summary: your single vote among thousands, to hundred-thousands, to millions, will not matter, as a near mathematical certainty. Factor in the costs, defined broadly in the economists’ sense to include other uses of your time, etc., and you are probably losing by voting. It’s like buying a lottery ticket, only the odds are even worse and the costs are even higher. You loser!

I know better than to argue against mathematics, but I believe this is another one of those areas where human behavior, social interaction, and general cultural fuzziness blur the picture of the supposedly “cold, hard facts.” Simply put, people’s beliefs and their sense of community and duty motivate them to engage in said “irrational” act and, collectively, their votes DO matter. How exactly does the individual translate into the collective? When does subtracting grains of sand from a heap turn it into a non-heap? There is no answer. If a church, especially one of the modern suburban “mega churches”, aggressively encourages its members to vote, and most of them vote the same way, you may be talking about several hundred or a thousand or more votes in the same direction. More than enough to swing everybody’s favorite sunshine state in November 2000.

More people actually self-identify as Democrats, but the GOP keeps winning elections (hopefully a trend that is about to come to a close). This is because it is, in fact, the supposedly hard-headed, rational, economic-minded Republicans who turn out to vote in larger numbers. Surely it is their belief in the aggregate significance of their votes that motivates them as a class of voters. So the partisans of “selfishness and greed” turns out to be more community minded than the “socialists” on the other side? ;-) Yes, there is still the inescapable fact that a single vote is enormously unlikely to make a difference, but then it is also true that if many people are convinced by this logic, then their aggregate non-votes really do add up—and therefore make a difference!

Then there is the whole issue of political participation in the larger sense. That is, not just the act of voting, but the act of talking politics, of trying to sway others’ votes—or to vote at all. If self-identified Democrats are less likely to vote than self-identified Republicans, then imagine the effect of a widely heard argument to “get to the polls because it really does matter.” Let’s say few thousand more people showed up to vote in Florida in 2000. Some would have voted Republican, some Democratic, but plausibly more Democrats, because there were more Democrats who didn’t vote! So if the net result was 500-something more votes for Gore, then… In reality, perhaps the true answer is this: speak your mind, support your candidates or parties as you see fit. Encourage people to vote for your chosen people or causes. But in the end, if you don’t actually vote yourself, it won’t matter so much. Strangely paradoxical perhaps: as long as you are active, you can potentially make a difference, but your actual vote probably doesn’t count. So get out there and vote! I did. (Or am I just trying to bluff you?!)

Thursday, November 02, 2006

The Parsimonious Multiverse?

A number of people (physicists, other scientists, and interested laypersons) have prominently taken some big swings at string theory recently. (I saw at least two books on a recent walk through a local Barnes & Noble.) I'll comment on string theory another time, but here's what troubles me: If we're demanding empirical results, what about the widely discussed anthropic principle and "many worlds" interpretation of quantum mechanics? A couple of articles have recently referred to the anthropic principle, arguing from opposite sides in the theism/atheism debate.

Richard Dawkins uses the anthropic principle it in a recent essay, which I assume is in sync with his recently published book, to address questions about cosmology, while a cogent, well-written piece by (presumed) theist Frederick Turner in another forum uses the consequences of the anthropic principle against atheism (in a limited sense).

But is the anthropic principle truly parsimonious? What physical evidence, if any, actually supports the idea that the observable universe represents but a mote in an (essentially) infinite sea of possible universes (or "multiverse")? One of the better arguments for the multiverse I have read was the quantum computing argument from David Deutsch. But in the end, his argument is explicitly about the explanatory power of the multiverse theory, NOT about anything that is required by the data, as far as I can tell. That is, pure quantum math and reasoning produces the results of quantum computation, and nothing about the multiverse makes any prediction(s) that are distinct from "standard" "uncontroversial" quantum analysis. If all the multiverse does is to provide a convenient resolution to some metaphysical questions that trouble some (many?) cosmologists and quantum philosophers, then surely it is less than science and even worse than string theory in this regard. It must somehow produce predictions as well as have explanatory power, if it is going to count as real science. Frederick Turner points out that the multiverse thesis would indicate that God (or something indistinguishable from God) should exist in at least some subset of the multiverse! This is, of course, far from demonstrating that our universe has a God, but a clever bit of logical jujitsu nonetheless. (Bravo, Mr. Turner! But I really must balk at the wildly overreaching assertion that religion is "perhaps the most powerful… survival strategy.") But isn't this "proof" that God is out there somewhere (if not necessarily here) really an excellent illustration that the whole multiverse/anthropic principle meta-cosmology is NOT parsimonious? If God in our own universe is not parsimonious (and I tend to agree with the atheistic notion that He/She is not) then a bunch of alternate universes with their own "Gods" hardly seems elegant and Occam-slashed.

Wednesday, November 01, 2006

I'll Have What He's Having...

Jacob Sullum is on board with some fairly right-minded libertarian thinking about the big-government GOP. I've beat that drum multiple times in the past, of course. A couple of notable nuggets from Sullum's article: Bush is now a bigger spender that LBJ, at least in discretionary spending (probably the best measure). And there is empirical evidence that divided government restrains the rate of government spending. All good reasons to go punch the big "D" next Tuesday. I just hope we haven't been set up for a big "miracle comeback by Rovian wizardry" story. If that happens, I guess I just throw up my hands and walk away. Or maybe just throw up.